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Making Sense Of The Prejudgment
Seizure Cases
By

RICHARD

S. KAY* & HAROLD M. LUBIN**

The purpose of this article is to examine critically four
recent Supreme Court cases on prejudgment seizure, Sniadach
v. Family Finance Corp.,I Fuentes v. Shevin,2 Mitchell v. W.T.
Grant Co., 3 and North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem,
Inc.' These cases have been cited as an arch-example of inconsistency, even irrationality, in constitutional doctrine. Members of the Supreme Court and numerous scholars have expressed chagrin at the apparent irresponsible obscurity at this
difficult intersection of creditors' remedies and constitutional
rights.5 We believe, however, that the search for reasonable and
rational constitutional standards is not a hopeless task. We
hope to show that there are emerging recognizable, if still indistinct, tests, against which state schemes for balancing the prejudgment rights of creditors and debtors may be measured. In
short, we will assert that the recent prejudgment seizure cases,
read together sympathetically, make sense.
* Assistant Professor, University of Connecticut School of Law.
** Staff Attorney, Tolland-Windham Legal Assistance Project Inc., Danielson,
Connecticut.
1 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
2 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
416 U.S. 600 (1974).
419 U.S. 601 (1975).
Justice Blackmun, dissenting in North GeorgiaFinishing,Inc., declared that the
justices were "immersed in confusion, with Fuentes one way, Mitchell another, and
now this case decided in a manner that leaves counsel and the commercial communities in other states uncertain as to whether their own established and long-accepted
statutes pass constitutional muster with a wavering tribunal off in Washington, D.C."
419 U.S. at 619. See, e.g., Hansford, ProceduralDue Process in the Debtor-Creditor
Relationship: The Impact of Di-Chem, 9 GA. L. REV. 589, 606-09 (1975); Katz &
Robinson, Due Process and Creditors' Remedies: From Sniadach and Fuentes to
Mitchell, North Georgia and Beyond, 28 RUTro. L. REV. 541, 562 (1975); Scott,
ConstitutionalRegulation of ProvisionalCreditors'Remedies: The Cost of Procedural
Due Process, 61 VA. L. REV. 807, 809 (1975); Comment, ConstitutionalLaw, 1975 U.
ILL. L.F. 263; Comment, Due Processand the CreditorsRight to PrejudgmentSeizure,
10 GONZAGA L. REv. 757, 770-775 (1975).
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BACKGROUND

The facts and reasoning of the Supreme Court in this area
have been canvassed in voluminous commentary.6 Therefore, a
brief summary of the pattern of constitutional law the recent
cases have created should be sufficient before applying a closer
analysis. The modem Court's first venture into the area occurred in 1969 in Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.7 in which
a Wisconsin statute authorizing creditors to garnish the wages
of an allegedly defaulting debtor was struck down. In a brief
opinion Justice Douglas emphasized the hardship wage garnishment may impose on an impoverished debtor and held that
"[w]here the taking of one's property is so obvious" it was
required by the fourteenth
clear that notice and hearing were
8
amendment prior to the seizure.
The 1972 decision in Fuentes v. Shevin9 answered many of
the questions on the scope and quality of due process protection
to debtors left unanswered in Sniadach. In that case the Court
invalidated Florida and Pennsylvania replevin procedures permitting seizure of goods on the ex parte application of any
person claiming a right to them. Justice Stewart's opinion for
the four member majority rejected the claim that only seizures
of basic necessities were required to be preceded by notice and
hearing, noting that the fourteenth amendment protects
"'property' generally",' 0 and the Court would not evaluate the
relative importance of different goods to litigants. The Court
also carved out certain "extraordinary situations" in which the
requirements of due process might be relaxed but found the
challenged statutes to be outside these exceptions. Declaring
I See, e.g., Clark and Landers, Sniadach, Fuentes and Beyond: The Creditor
Meets the Constitution,59 VA. L. REV. 355 (1973); Countryman, The Bill of Rights and
the Bill Collector, 14 ARiz. L. REV. 521 (1973); Phillips, Revolution and Counterrevolution: The Supreme Court on Creditors' Remedies, 3 FORDHAM URBAN L.J. 1 (1974);
Rendleman, Analyzing the Debtor's Due Process Interest, 17 WM. AND MARY L. REV.
"35 (1975); The Supreme Court, 1971 Term, 86 HARV. L. REV. 50, 85 (1972); The Supreme Court, 1973 Term, 88 HARv. L. REv. 41, 71 (1974). See authorities cited note 5
supra.
7 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
Id. at 342.
407 U.S. 67 (1972).
,OId. at 90. Justice Stewart emphasized this by noting that unless a property
interest can be characterized as de minimis the deprivation must be preceded by notice
and hearing. Id. at 90, n. 21.
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that these situations must be "truly unusual," it implied that
there is a presumption that prejudgment seizure procedures are
invalid unless a strong showing is made that only "extraordinary situations" are covered."
In Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co.,' 2 decided in 1974, the
Louisiana sequestration statute directing seizure of goods held
by an allegedly defaulting debtor on the ex parte application
of a creditor holding a vendor's lien on the goods was upheld.
Significantly, the four justices of the Fuentes majority dissented, while Justice White, author of the Fuentes dissent,
wrote the opinion for a majority created by the addition of
Justices Powell and Rehnquist, who had not participated in
Fuentes. The opinion stressed that the due process clause was
flexible enough to accommodate schemes protecting the property interests of creditors as well as debtors 3 and distinguished
Fuentes on four grounds: (1) The Mitchell scheme required the
creditor to allege specific facts supporting his claim rather than
the bare assertion of a right sufficient in the statutes struck
down in Fuentes. (2) In Mitchell the application for seizure was
made to a judge not a "court functionary." (3) The grounds for
seizure in Fuentes were merely that the goods were "wrongfully
detained" whereas the Mitchell procedure was more narrowly
confined. (4) In Mitchell and absent from Fuentes the debtor
had a right to an immediate postseizure hearing at which the
creditor had to prove his right to possession." Justice Powell
concurred, but concluded that Fuentes, broadly construed, had
been overruled.'"
Finally, in North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem,
Inc., 6 the Court again was faced with a garnishment statute.
The Court's brief opinion was again authored by Justice White,
joined by the four Justices of the Fuentes majority who had
dissented in Mitchell. Finding that the distinguishing features
of the Louisiana sequestration scheme in Mitchell" were absent
1

Id. at 90, 91, 93.

12

416 U.S. 600 (1974).

,3 Id. at 604.
" Id. at 615-618.

11Id. at 623. In their dissent Justices Stewart, Douglas, and Marshall also abandoned hope for Fuentes. Id. at 635.
11419 U.S. 601 (1975).
27

Supra note 14.
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from the Georgia garnishment law sub judice, the Court applied Fuentes and found the statute unconstitutional.'S Justice
Powell concurred only in the judgment emphasizing what he
saw as Mitchell's permanent departure from the apparently
absolute requirement of prior notice and hearing in Fuentes.'"
II.

THE EXTRAORDINARY SITUATIONS

Although Mitchell cannot be reconciled with Fuentes sentence by sentence, Fuentes, read as a whole, does not stand for
the inflexible requirement that every state-assisted taking be
preceded by notice and hearing.20 Indeed, Part VI of that opinion is concerned with situations in which deprivations of property may take place consistent with the due process clause
without prior notice and hearing. These limited, truly unusual,
"extraordinary situations" contain, we submit, the key to understanding the rule which emerges from these cases. It will be
useful, therefore, to examine the Court's statement of these
situations in Fuentes:
First, in each case, the seizure has been directly necessary to secure an important governmental or general public
interest. Second, there has been a special need for very
prompt action. Third, the State has kept strict control over
its monopoly of legitimate force: the person initiating the
seizure has been a government official responsible for determining, under the standards of a narrowly drawn statute,
that it was necessary and justified in the particular in2
stance.

" Id. at 606-07.
,Id. at 609.
2' The Court's statement in Fuentes that "no later hearing and no damage award
can undo the fact that the arbitrary taking that was subject to the right of procedural
due process has already occurred," Id. at 82, spawned views that Fuentes stood for a
rule both Procrustean and contrary to the flexibility inherent in the concept of due
process. Mitchell v. W.T. Grant, 416 U.S. 600, 628 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring).
21 407 U.S. at 91. The Court included in the first exception prior cases in which
the seizure was appropriate because the welfare of the public was endangered. See,
e.g., Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594 (1950)(seizure of mislabelled
articles because of potential injury to consumers); Fabey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245
(1947)(appointment of conservator of a bank where interests of creditors and public
at stake); Coffin Bros. v. Bennett, 277 U.S. 29 (1920)(execution against stockholders
of insolvent bank to protect public and depositors). Other important governmental
interests have also been sufficient. See, e.g., Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing
Co., 416 U.S. 663 (1974)(seizure of a yacht pursuant to Puerto Rican law) discussed in
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If we take the majority opinion at its word in Mitchell, it
did not in that case overrule Fuentes but merely distinguished
it. If this assertion strained our credulity in Mitchell, it must
surely seem more plausible after North Georgia Finishing,Inc.
for which Fuentes provided the controlling precedent. Given
this assumption and the broad holding of Fuentes, it becomes
necessary to accommodate Mitchell to the "extraordinary situations" exception of Fuentes.22 It will be helpful to take a closer
look at those exceptions.
We must first inquire whether the criteria of the "extraordinary situations" exception are disjunctive or conjunctive.
While the language quoted above seems to describe cumulative
characteristics of a single situation, 23 the Court's elaboration
and illustrations of these criteria make it clear as a matter of
logic that the presence of any one of these three qualities characterizes a situation in which a seizure may occur before notice
note 23 infra; Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961)(discharge of a federal employee who had not met security requirements); Phillips v.
Commissioner, 283 U.S. 589 (1931)(collection of taxes by summary procedure).
" But see Comment, Justice White's Chemistry: The Mitchellization of Fuentes,
50 WASH. L. REV. 901, 905 (1975); Comment, ConstitutionalLaw, 1975 U. ILL. L. F.
263, 265 (1975). The first comment suggests that Justice White carved out a new
"extraordinary situation" in Mitchell. Similarly, Justice Stewart in his dissenting
opinion in Mitchell, expressed the view that the general ability of the debtor-possessor
to waste or dispose of the secured property cannot itself create an "extraordinary
situation." 416 U.S. at 629-30, n. 1.
1 But see Scott, supra note 5, at 826-27, n. 87; Comment, ConstitutionalLaw,
1975 U. ILL. L.F. 263, 265. Also, in Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416
U.S. 663, 679 (1974), the Court appeared to be applying the three criteria cumulatively to sustain a Puerto Rican procedure for seizure of vessels used for unlawful
purposes without notice and hearing. The second criterion, however, was used in a way
very different from that illustrated in Fuentes. The opinion of Justice Brennan indicates that there was a need for promptness to serve the public interest satisfying the
first criterion rather than a private interest. This interpretation, however, adds nothing
to the first criterion which itself demands the seizure be necessary to support the public
interest. Clearly a prehearing seizure in which there was no need for promptness would
not be necessary. The Court's discussion of the third criterion focused only on the
initial determination of seizure, not the availability of a later adversary hearing. The
statute in issue, however, did provide postseizure notice and opportunity for hearing
to at least some of the interested parties. Id. at 667-68. The Court's approach in CaleroToledo was modeled on a footnote example in Fuentes itself, categorizing seizures
under search warrants as "extraordinary situations." 407 U.S. at 93-94, n. 30. Justice
White's concurring opinion in Calero-Toledobased simply on the presence of an important public interest, is more in keeping with subsequent developments as understood
by this article. 416 U.S. at 691. See Comment, Due Process and the Creditor'sRight
to PrejudgmentSeizure, 10 GONZAGA L. REV. 757, 762-65 (1975).
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and hearing are required.
It is clear that a single situation cannot embody both the
first and second criterion simultaneously. In expounding the
meaning of the first criterion, the Court stressed that it was
intended to permit seizures in which the public had an urgent
interest. The Court cited as examples of these governmental or
public interests "the needs of a national war effort, to protect
against the economic disaster of a bank failure, and to protect
2
the public from misbranded drugs and contaminated food." '
A seizure in which "no more than private gain is directly at
stake" 25 such as that in Fuentes, was clearly not within this
first category. The contrast with the Court's description of the
second criterion could not be more striking. In describing situations in which there is "a special need for prompt action," the
Court's first and only example is a case "in which a creditor
could make a showing of immediate danger that a debtor will
destroy or conceal disputed goods. '2 This is also a case where
"no more than private gain" is at stake, however, and the first
criterion clearly cannot apply. It should therefore be pellucid
that an "extraordinary situation" justifying seizure before a
hearing may exist even if only one criterion is satisfied. This
should be sufficient to reject the contention that "extraordinary situations" under Fuentes must contain all three criteria.
An attempt to read Mitchell and Fuentes together reenforces this conclusion. As will be demonstrated below, the
Mitchell situation cannot reasonably be characterized as satisfying either the first or second criterion. Therefore the result
upholding the sequestration procedure can only be justified as
exemplifying the third criterion, strict government control of a
procedure narrowly defined and applied.
The dissenting opinion of Justice Stewart in Mitchell also
demonstrates an understanding of the independence of the
three criteria defining "extraordinary situations." The dissent,
in a footnote, replied to the holding of the Louisiana Supreme
Court, which distinguished Fuentes on the ground that sequestration was required to protect creditors from imminent danger
of injury to the disputed goods, that is, that it satisfied the
21 407 U.S. at 92.
2, Id.

" Id. at 93.
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second criterion. The dissent argued that this characterization
could not reasonably be made of every creditor-debtor situation
to which the sequestration procedure applied. 27 It thus appeared to concede that if the statute were restricted to situations of imminent danger to the goods, the Louisiana court's
holding would be persuasive. Significantly, Justice Stewart did
not argue that, in any event, satisfaction of this criterion alone
would not suffice to create an extraordinary situation since the
other two criteria were manifestly absent, an obvious argument
if the three criteria were conjunctive.
If the argument is so far valid, the decisions in Mitchell
and North Georgia Finishing,Inc. make clear that the criterion
which has emerged as the most important is the third-strict
government control of a narrowly drawn seizure procedure.
III.

EXCEPTIONAL PROCEDURE

A.

As AN

EXTRAORDINARY SITUATION

The Rationale of Mitchell

Only the application of the third criterion of an extraordinary situation can adequately account for the result in
Mitchell. Certain features of the Louisiana procedure make it
tempting to categorize it instead as falling under the second
criterion. Indeed, this was the position of the Louisiana Supreme Court.2 8 Furthermore, certain language of Justice
White's opinion echoes the values protected by this criterion. 9
On close analysis, however, this conclusion must be rejected as
justifying the Mitchell result.
Fuentes illustrates the second criterion, "a special need for
very prompt action," with the example of cases in which a
creditor can demonstrate that there is an imminent danger to
the secured goods if they are left with the debtor."0 The
Mitchell opinion points to such risks to the creditor in discounting the propriety of the absolute requirement of a prior
hearing.3' Moreover, the Louisiana sequestration statute called
for the creditor to plead facts showing that "it is within the
power of the [debtor] to conceal, dispose of, or waste the prop"
2

416 U.S. at 629, n. 1.
Id. commenting on 269 So.2d 186 (1972).

21

Id. at 609.

407 U.S. at 93.
5'416 U.S. at 609.
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erty .... ,,32
This provision of the statute, however, is not
sufficient to show that the sequestration procedure upheld by
the Court is restricted to situations in which there is a special
need for prompt action. The requirement that it be "within the
power" of the debtor to waste the secured property describes
practically every case of consumer credit including those at
issue in Fuentes and North Georgia Finishing, Inc. Justice
Stewart's dissent in Mitchell is undoubtedly correct when it
asserts that if this satisfied the Fuentes criterion, it would
make every extension of credit in the sale of goods an extraordi33
nary situation and would obliterate the Fuentes rule.
However, the majority in Mitchell plainly did not regard
the case as falling within the second exception of a special need
for prompt action. The need to provide protection to the creditor's interest is illustrated in that case, not only by the debtor's
power to vandalize or conceal the property, but also by the fact
that the debtor will make ordinary use of the goods thus depreciating their value at a time when the creditor is not compensated by continuing payments. This is not, nor could it be,
classified as an extraordinary situation. Rather it shows that
the common realities of consumer credit provide sufficient justification for prejudgment seizure if one of the other two criteria of an extraordinary situation is present. Since we are concerned only with seizures on behalf of private creditors, we are
left with the third criterion-that of procedure.
B.

The Requisites of a Substitute Procedure

It is useful to examine again the language of the third
exception in Fuentes: "[Tihe state has kept strict control over
its monopoly of legitimate force: the person initiating the seizure has been a government official responsible for determining, under the standards of a narrowly drawn statute, that it
'34 It
was necessary and justified in the particular instance.
should be noted that unlike the first two criteria, this formula
does not refer to the substantive reasons justifying a prehearing
seizure. It deals solely with the manner in which the seizure is
carried out. Since we have shown that the criteria present inde32416 U.S. at 623; LA. CODE CIV. PROC., art. 3571 (1961).
416 U.S. at 629, n. 1.
407 U.S. at 91.
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pendent reasons for allowing ex parte seizures, it must follow
that an appropriate procedure may satisfy due process even
when utilized to foster a policy objective other than the swift
response to urgent public or private needs covered by the first
two criteria. Such an objective would be provided by the reconciliation of the conflicting interests of creditor and debtor discussed in Justice White's opinion in Mitchell. Under this analysis, an "extraordinary" situation is created by serving an
"ordinary" interest through a procedure other than prior notice
and hearing which is exceptionally protective of the interests
3
of the party against whom the seizure is directed. 1
The third criterion seems to indicate that the exceptional
procedure demanded must have two aspects. First, the decision
as to whether a particular situation calls for summary seizures
is to be made rationally by a neutral official whose discretion
is narrowly confined by statute. Second, the departure from
rudimentary due process must be the minimum necessary to
accomplish the policy objectives at stake. Therefore, the opportunity for a hearing must be afforded the party suffering the
deprivation as soon as is practicable following the seizure
which protects the party in whose behalf it is executed.36 These
requirements manifest the Fuentes Court's concern with due
process not as a theoretical command to be satisfied by a single
response but as a means of minimizing the number and effect
of occurrences of mistaken and arbitrary deprivations.3 The
limitation of prejudgment seizures to cases carefully specified
by statute and verified by a discriminating neutral observer
should reduce the instances of wrongful taking. The provision
of a swift and effective alternate procedure may not be as effecWe recognize that the term "extraordinary" might be inappropriate in describing procedure which may be generally applied. We have chosen to continue the use of
that term, however, because we believe that the values protected by the procedural
alternatives discussed are identical to those implicit in the third "extraordinary" situation of the Fuentes opinion. See text accompanying note 34 supra. In a sense, use of
the term "extraordinary" may be unfortunate, for the implementation of those procedures should win them familiarity.
11Thus in the context of school suspensions the Court has held that due process
may be satisfied in certain narrow situations by provision of a hearing within a short
time after the suspension. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 582-83 (1975). As to the mode
of procedure which should be required when one of the first two criteria excuses the
need for prior notice and hearing see note 53 infra.
11 407 U.S. at 81.
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tive in achieving the stated goal of due process as requiring
prior notice and hearing in every case, but it may, when combined with an independently desirable goal, create the "extraordinary" situation in which an exception to the presumptive rule is appropriate.
The cases which followed Fuentes confirm this analysis. It
has already been noted that Mitchell involved neither a special
public interest nor an urgent private need for prompt action to
protect property from concealment or injury. Mitchell does
stress, however, the legitimacy of the state's decision to protect
the creditor's interest in certain situations and the special measures provided to protect the debtor from whose possession the
property is seized."
Both aspects of the third criterion of Fuentes' extraordinary situations were found present in Mitchell.3 9 Moreover, it
is the presence of these same aspects indicating the satisfaction
of the third criterion which provides the basis on which the
Mitchell majority distinguished Fuentes. As to the first aspect,
the Louisiana procedure, which provided for a judicial examination of specific facts justifying the seizure, presumably assures an intelligent discriminating decision that the conflicting
claims of ownership are such that the narrow statutory policy
of allowing temporary possession by the creditor applies. 0 The
Court took pains to show by citation to Louisiana law that the
issuance of the writ was more than a "ministerial act" and that
the debtor was not at "the unsupervised mercy of the creditor
and court functionaries."' While there is a dispute between the
dissent and the majority as to the actual character of the issuance of the writ in Louisiana,4 2 the important point is that the
Court's opinion was based on what it believed to be provision
for a meaningful examination of the application for seizure by
a neutral and discriminating magistrate which would reduce
the instances of mistaken seizure.
3, 416 U.S. at 625 (Powell, J., concurring).
31See note 36, supra and accompanying text.
11416 U.S. at 616. Recently the Louisiana Supreme Court has held the procedural
protections required by Mitchell do not demand that the seizure be authorized by a
judge rather than a court clerk. The court emphasized that the Supreme Court cases
dwell only on the function and not on the title of the relevant offices. Hood Motor Co.
Inc. v. Lawrence, 329 So.2d 111 (La. 1975).
" 416 U.S. at 616.
42 Id. at 632-3.
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The second aspect of the procedural exception of Fuentes
was also held to have been satisfied by the Mitchell majority.
The departure from the standard due process protections of
prior notice and hearing were seen as sufficiently slight to minimize the injury which might arise from a mistaken deprivation.43 The Louisiana statute provided that after the seizure, an
immediate hearing was available to the debtor at which the
writ would be dissolved and the property returned unless the
creditor carried the burden of proving his right to the property.4 Thus the duration of the deprivation was kept to a strict
minimum which would be extended only so long as the debtor
delayed seeking a hearing. In addition, on such dissolution the
debtor was entitled to damages for the taking and for attorney's
fees, both amounts secured by the posting of a bond required
by the creditor as a precondition for issuance of the writ. ",
When Fuentes was called upon in North Georgia Finishing, Inc. to strike down the Georgia garnishment statute, the
Court was again faced with a case in which neither of the first
two criteria of Fuentes' "extraordinary situations" were present. " Thus, issue was joined on the presence or absence of the
procedural protections afforded to satisfy the third criterion.
The Court concluded that the prejudgment seizure of wages in
that case did not comport with due process because there had
been no "notice and . . . opportunity for a hearing or other
safeguard against mistaken repossession. . . ."I' The circumstances in which the Georgia writ was issued were far less protective of the debtor's interest and did not attempt to minimize
Id. at 618.
Id.; See also LA. CODE Civ. PRoc., art. 3506 (1961).
416 U.S. at 606.
IS The seizure was not directly necessary to secure an important governmental or
general interest nor was there a special need for prompt action. North Georgia Finishing, Inc. presented the Court with an opportunity to restrict the procedural protections
to deprivations of wages or other vital property. This was the approach of the Georgia
Supreme Court in its opinion upholding the challenged statute. 201 S.E. 2d 321, 323
(Ga. 1973). But that court failed to even cite Fuentes. Had the Supreme Court approved this reasoning, Fuentes would have become an aberration. In fact, North Georgia Finishing,Inc. made clear that it would follow Fuentes' broad sweep in this regard:
"We are no more inclined now than we have been in the past to distinguish among
different kinds of property in applying the Due Process Clause." 419 U.S. 608.
Compare the opinion of Justice Blackmun joined by Justice Rehnquist. 419 U.S. at
614 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
"1 419 U.S. at 606 (emphasis added).
"

"
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mistaken deprivations. Instead of a judge acting on specific
allegations, the garnishment writ could be issued by a court
clerk on conclusory allegations of a debt and a pending action
thereon."' Also, unlike Mitchell, there was no means by which
a defendant whose funds were seized could swiftly challenge
the grounds for the seizure, recover his property, and be compensated for the injury he suffered because of the deprivation. 9
Indeed, it appeared that only the filing of a counter-bond (itself
a type of deprivation) was available to the defendant as a
means of recovering his property pendente lite."0 The vice in the
Georgia statute was not merely its failure to provide prior notice and hearing. It also lacked "saving characteristics,"' protective procedures which minimize both the risk and
injury of
52
takings by the state which turn out to be improper.
C.

The Insufficiency of Exceptional Procedure

It may be necessary to dispel a mistaken inference which
could be drawn from the argument made above. Since it has
been shown that any of the three criteria described in Fuentes
is sufficient to create an extraordinary situation and an exemption from the requirement of prior notice and hearing, it appears that the third criterion developed in Mitchell and North
Georgia Finishing, Inc. provides a justification for summary
seizure from procedure alone. This notion would allow ex parte
seizures for the most frivolous, arbitrary, or invidious reasons
so long as the decision was made in the right way by the proper
official, and an opportunity for quick reversal with a minimum
of lasting harm was provided thus satisfying both criteria.
This is not the rule which we see emerging from the cases.
These cases are concerned solely with the timing of state takings with respect to notice and hearing, not with the substantive policy reasons which might prompt the state to engage in
such takings. This does not mean that such objectives are beId. at 607.
Therefore both aspects of the procedural exception of Fuentes, supra note 40
and accompanying text, were absent. Id.
I Id. This protection was deemed inadequate in Fuentes, as well. 407 U.S. at 8485, n. 14.
Id.
5 See Hansford, supra note 5 at 603, 605.
'
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yond constitutional control. The equal protection clause and
whatever substantive elements remain of the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment preclude takings which
are arbitrary or entirely unrelated to permissible objects of
state regulation. This is, however, a separate question from
what factors allow a state to dispense with the ordinary procedural due process requirement that takings be preceded by
notice and the opportunity for hearing. 1
It is clear that the substantive policy reasons for the taking
do influence the answer to this principal question when those
reasons fall within the first two criteria of Fuentes' extraordinary situations. In those cases the reasons for the seizure necessarily imply a need for haste which justifies dispensing with the
notice and hearing. When the third criterion is utilized, however, the substantive reasons are not relevant to this inquiry.
So long as the purpose is permissible, it may be furthered by
prejudgment seizure if that seizure is hedged with the necessary protective procedures. We then have an extraordinary situation created not because of the pressing nature of the interest
at stake but because the procedures invoked are a close substitute for the traditional procedural safeguards. 4
5 Just as procedure alone does not justify a taking without a substantive reason,
we assume the employment of the first or second criteria for summary seizures does
not provide an excuse for total abandonment of procedural rights of the person
deprived. Due process will still require that that person be given an opportunity to
show that the taking was wrongful. Moreover, that opportunity should be provided as
soon as is practical under the circumstances. See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 583
(1975). In short, the same postseizure procedures which partially justify seizures under
the third criteria would be required in every case of seizure without hearing. However,
there would still be a significant distinction between the different criteria with respect
to the steps which must be taken before the seizure to justify dispensing with notice
and a hearing. Such steps would be decreasingly formal as the urgency of the need for
the seizure increased.
11Thus there are two kinds of procedures which satisfy due process. One is the
"ordinary" system in which the taking is preceded by notice and opportunity to reply.
The second is the "extraordinary" system in which the alternate procedures provide
an adequate substitute. The recent case of Mathews v. Eldridge, 96 Sup. Ct. 893 (1976)
is not contrary to our argument. In that case the discontinuance of social security
disability payments was held permissible in a procedure which permitted delay of any
face to face hearing for as much as a year after termination. Id. at 906. This would
clearly be inadequate to create the extraordinary procedure alternative. But we see
Eldridge as illustrating one version of the ordinary situation. Unlike the challenged
takings in Fuentes, Mitchell, or North Georgia Finishing, Inc., the recipient in
Eldridge was given fairly complete advance notice of the proposed termination and
supporting reasons and was given time before termination to respond in writing. The
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Thus the interest of the state in accommodating the different interests of a secured creditor and a debtor in possession
on the occasion of a disputed default has been endorsed by the
Supreme Court in Mitchell as one which the state may properly
pursue by the device of summary seizure pending a final judicial determination."' This interest however is ordinary. It is the
special protection to the debtor provided by the sequestration
statute creating the extraordinary situation which allows dispensing with the prior hearing. The Court in North Georgia
Finishing, Inc. had no occasion to evaluate the substantive
reason for prejudgment seizure, since in any event the
procedural safeguards necessary to convert its use into an extraordinary situation were missing. The interest in that case
was to preserve for a civil plaintiff the resources necessary to
satisfy a potential judgment. It is apparent that with the proper procedure this interest would be sufficient to create an
extraordinary situation. This would follow from the Mitchell
Court's citation of earlier cases upholding the creation of prejudgment attachment liens, in particular McKay v. McInnes,
the 1929 per curiam opinion sustaining the Maine general attachment statute." Such a procedure was deemed a legitimate
part of a state's apparatus for the vindication of claims.',7
D.

The Content of the Post-Seizure Hearing: Carey v. Sugar

When we recognize that ex parte seizures might be justified by a number of legitimate state interests, a further ambiguity arises. To what extent must the substitute procedural
form of prior notice and opportunity to respond is a matter which may legitimately
vary with the kind of interests at stake. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. at 96-97 (1972).
See, Note, Specifying the ProceduresRequired by Due Process:Toward Limits On the
Use of Interest Balancing, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1510, 1511 (1975). The Court in Eldridge
believed a written prior hearing was appropriate in that case.
416 U.S. at 607.
279 U.S. 820 (1929), cited at 416 U.S. 613-14. The McKay case has had a
checkered history in the modern decisions. It was cited by Justice Douglas in Sniadach
to illustrate that some summary procedures may be satisfactory for "attachments in
general" 395 U.S. at 340. In Fuentes Justice Stewart practically overruled McKay by
limiting its effect to the cases on which it relied, both of which could be accomodated
by the "extraordinary situations" exception. In Mitchell, Justice White restored
McKay's vitality by relying on it to show that commercial interests could justify a
departure from a strict rule of prior notice and hearing. 416 U.S. at 613. The case was
not cited in North Georgia Finishing,Inc.
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protections vary according to the interest which is being
served?
Given the proper saving procedures, a prejudgment seizure
might be allowed either to accomodate the interests of lien
creditors and consumer-debtors during a dispute, or to secure
a plaintiff's potential judgment. In either case a key feature in
the necessary substitute procedure would be a prompt opportunity for a judicial determination of whether the taking was
wrong. It is not clear, however, what facts would be relevant
to such a determination in each case. Nor is it obvious that the
subjects of these hearings would be the same given the different
reasons for the seizure.
This very issue was raised in a case heard last term in the
Supreme Court. In Carey v. Sugar,58 the validity of the New
York attachment statute was challenged in an action brought
by a state court defendant. Under the New York statute, the
state court plaintiff had attached, without notice or hearing,
funds in the hands of a third party owed to the defendant. The
New York procedure allowed a judge to issue such an order on
the ex parte application of a creditor who claimed there existed
certain specified grounds for believing any future judgment
might be imperiled by acts of the defendant.59 Furthermore, the
statute provided that the writ could be vacated prior to judgment on motion of the defendant."0 The three judge court, although finding many similarities between this procedure and
the Louisiana sequestration statute upheld in Mitchell, determined that the postseizure hearing in New York was fatally
distinguishable from that in Mitchell. Specifically, the district
court determined that the hearing made available under New
York law focused solely on the necessity of continuing the dep1 Some commentators have suggested that a more rigorous procedural requirement might be imposed in the case of general attachment where the seizing plaintiff
does not have a pre-existing property interest in the thing taken. See Hansford, supra
note 5 at 606; Comment, Justice White's Chemistry: The Mitchellizationof Fuentes,
50 WASH. L. REV. 901, 908-10 (1975). In Sugar v. Curtis Circulation Co., 383 F. Supp.
643 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), discussed at text accompanying notes 58-64 infra, the district
court drew the same distinction in deciding that the New York attachment procedure
should be measured against the standards of Fuentes and not Mitchell.
zA425 U.S. 73 (1976) vacating and remanding Sugar v. Curtis Circulation Co., 383
F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
' 383 F. Supp. 643, 644 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
Id. at 648.
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rivation to maintain the security of the plaintiff, whereas the
hearing found satisfactory in Mitchell focused on whether
grounds existed for issuing the writ. Thus the hearing approved
by the Court in Mitchell examined the substantive merits of
the claim of the plaintiff creditor."
The Supreme Court, however, in a per curiam opinion,
found that the district court had been too hasty in placing this
construction on the New York statute. State court cases prior
to and after the lower court decision indicated that the law
might, in fact, demand a prompt hearing on the merits as in
Mitchell. If this were the case, the Court was of the opinion
that constitutional doubts as to the validity of the statute
would be removed. The case was therefore remanded to the
three judge court with directions to abstain from any decision
until the parties could get a state court construction of the
law. " The abstention was mandated under the principles of
Railroad Commission v. Pullman Co.63
It seems clear, therefore, that a quick postseizure hearing
on the merits of the controversy would be satisfactory whether
the grounds for the seizure were protection of the creditors'
preexisting property interest as in Mitchell or the securing of
assets to satisfy a potential judgment as in Sugar. This does
not, however, preclude the sufficiency of a hearing to determine
the need for security when only the latter interest is involved.
Indeed, Justice Powell, in his concurring opinion in Mitchell
saw the hearing there as an opportunity to determine the merits. In North GeorgiaFinishing,Inc., in discussing what would
be required of a valid pregarnishment procedure available to
plaintiffs generally, however, he contemplated only a hearing

"' The Court viewed this hearing as an opportunity to put the plaintiff to proof of
the existence of the interest, lien and delinquency. 416 U.S. at 606. This, at least, was
the Court's perception which for our purposes is the important point. See text accompanying notes 41-43 supra.
62 Carey v. Sugar, 425 U.S. 73 (1976). The Supreme Court merely noted in a
footnote two other grounds upon which the district court had distinguished the New
York procedure from that upheld in Mitchell. First, under New York law the attaching
plaintiff has no property interest in the goods and second, the burden of proof is on
the defendant at the subsequent hearing to dissolve the attachment. The former
ground in particular has been deemed crucial by some observers. See note 57 supra.
The Supreme Court, however, apparently viewed the purpose of the postseizure hearings as the critical variable.
- 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
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at which the plaintiff should show "probable cause to believe
there is a need to continue the garnishment for a sufficient
period of time to allow proof and satisfaction of the alleged
debt." 4 Whether this different kind of inquiry would be sufficient given the different purpose of the seizure was the question
which the Supreme Court in Sugar was able to avoid. A construction of the statute in keeping with that determined by the
district court would require consideration of that court's legal
conclusion that a hearing on the merits was necessary in both
cases.

Given this construction and the purposes of allowing an
alternative procedure to substitute for prior notice and hearing,
we believe, the three judge court's determination of the constitutional question was correct. At least in these two instances,
the postseizure hearings should investigate the same thing: the
underlying substantive claim on which the creditor bases his
right to immediate possession or the plaintiff his right to judgment. The purpose of the immediate postseizure hearing is to
minimize the impact on the defendant or debtor of deprivations which turn out to be mistaken.15 This hearing, together
with the careful preseizure examination which is intended to
cut down on the number of mistaken deprivations, serves the
purpose of the traditional due process protections prescribed in
Fuentes: "to minimize substantively unfair or mistaken deprivations of property ....
The mistaken deprivation in the context of the secured
creditor is plainly one in which there has been no default entitling the creditor to possession. Thus the focus of the postseizure hearing should be the likelihood of the creditor's ultimate
success in his claim on the merits. Only the establishment of
this ultimate issue can determine whether the creditor was
entitled to the protection from damage or wear provided by the
seizure. If the creditor's claim is to fail, the debtor's possession
should have continued uninterrupted and the seizure will have
been a mistake. Exactly the same analysis is applicable to
general attachment. Again we must focus on the ultimate outcome of the litigation to determine if it was proper to freeze the
, Compare 416 U.S. at 625 with 419 U.S. at 611-12.
416 U.S. 618.
407 U.S. 81.
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defendant's assets in anticipation of a judgment against him.
If it turns out that there is no judgment, the defendant will
have been deprived for nothing and the taking will have been
a mistake. Moreover, this will be a mistake no matter how poor
a risk the debtor-defendant was shown to be. There is, therefore, no reason for differentiating in this matter between the
lien creditors in Mitchell and the plaintiffs in Sugar. In each
case the justification for the taking is a protection against a
later contingency, and in each case the due process inquiry
should be focused on the probability of that contingency occurring. An inquiry limited to the question of the debtordefendant's ability or inclination to maintain resources to satisfy a judgment, as the district court found in the New York
procedure in Sugar, would make no distinction between serious, well-founded claims which were likely to result in a judgment and frivolous claims which would not bear up under even
casual scrutiny. The seizure decision, as the district court in
Sugar interpreted the statute, would turn not upon whether the
deprivation was likely to be necessary to serve a useful purpose
but upon the character or economic status of the defendant.
Such an inquiry would be irrelevant to the practical objectives
of due process protection. 7

IV.

EVALUATING THE EMERGING RULE

The interpretation of the prejudgment seizure cases we
have put forward is neither illogical, impractical, nor unfair
when considered in light of the different interests affected or
the values to be protected by procedural due process. The basic
problem in prescribing the procedural requirements of a constitutional deprivation consists in accommodating two antagonistic interests. The state, or the party on whose behalf the state
acts, has a legitimate interest in preserving intact the value of
" The question arises, however, whether the need for security should not have to
be proven in addition to the probable validity of the underlying claim. We think not.
An adequate procedure should be sufficient to justify prehearing seizure for any legitimate purpose. Having determined that there is a substantive claim by the plaintiff,
the security made possible by attachment is enough without a special showing of
insecurity. The converse would not be true, however. No seizure before notice and
hearing would be allowed on a showing of insecurity without the additional showing
of a substantive claim. Such takings would be entirely arbitrary since they would be
unrelated to any serious claim of the attaching party.
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the thing taken. Increased costs are imposed on the taking
party as procedural requirements enlarge the opportunity for
the party in possession through ordinary use or willful act to
diminish the value of the property. On the other hand, the
party in possession has a legitimate interest in maintaining
possession if the circumstances which might justify its termination are not actually present. Therefore, to the extent that
summary procedures create an increased risk of such wrongful
takings, costs are imposed on the party in possession. These
two kinds of costs cannot be reduced simultaneously. Reducing
one set of costs by definition increases the others. It is impossible to reconcile these interests; rather we must strike a balance
between them.
It might be possible to choose a procedural standard for
each class of potential seizures which minimizes the total costs
to both parties. Thus a rough pecuniary measurement might
inform us that given the incidence of mistaken seizures, the
kinds of goods involved, the observed behavior of consumerdebtors and the efficiency of judicial machinery, the total savings to consumers from a mandatory hearing before seizure of
consumer goods by secured creditors are less than the total
additional costs such a hearing would impose on the creditors.
On this finding we could conclude that the hearing requirement
is economically inefficient and refuse to require it. Such an
approach, however, would ignore the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment.
It is evident that the due process clause is an endorsement
of the interest of the party in possession. The clause is an
injunction against disturbing the existing balance of property
interests unless valid legal reasons are shown in an appropriate
procedure. As Justice Stewart observed in Fuentes, the point
is to minimize mistaken deprivations by the state. The interest
of the party demanding state assistance in altering the balance
of interests under a claim of legal right is not accorded similar
solicitude by the Constitution. Therefore, in balancing the relative costs of a given procedure, the fourteenth amendment directs that a presumptively greater weight be accorded the costs
of the party who might mistakenly be deprived of possession.
0 See The Supreme Court, 1971 Term, 86 HARV. L. REV. 50, 91 (1972). Boddie v.
Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) appears to present an exception to the notion that
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In fact it is possible to read the fourteenth amendment as
a rejection of any attempt to balance the two interests. Under
this interpretation, every state deprivation would be prohibited
where the legitimacy of the deprivation had not been established by the traditional fact-finding process of the law, the
efficacy of which is assumed. The due process clause under this
reading would be an injunction to reduce the costs to the party
in possession as near to zero as possible by similarly reducing
the risks of mistaken takings. 9 The majority opinion in Fuentes
strongly intimates that this absolute rule represents the proper
interpretation of the Constitution: "[N]o later hearing and no
damage award can undo the fact that the arbitrary taking that
was subject to the right of procedural due process has already
occurred. . ..

[T]he Court has traditionally insisted that,

whatever its form, opportunity for that hearing must be provided before the deprivation at issue takes effect."70
But Fuentes itself is evidence that the Court is not willing
to accept what Justice Powell labeled "a Procrustean rule of a
prior adversary hearing."'" The recognition of the extraordinary
situation is a declaration that the values protected by the due
process clause may be outweighed by other legitimate public
interests. The first two categories of extraordinary situations
are obvious examples. In these situations the exceptional costs
to the public welfare or state assisted private parties will be
greater than the costs of mistaken deprivations to parties in
due process protections guard only against those seeking to alter the status quo. In that
case, however, it is informative to note that Justice Harlan's opinion analogized indigent divorce plaintiffs to civil defendants in that both were attempting to resist or free
themselves of state imposed burdens in a situation where the state maintained a
monopoly on the means of relief. 401 U.S. at 374-78. Clearly the creditor-plaintiff
seeking state assistance can take little comfort from this precedent.
" We assume that the due process requirement of notice and an opportunity for
a hearing prior to taking incorporates a constitutional judgment that such procedures
are effective in eliminating mistaken deprivations. In fact, we might go further and
say that for purposes of constitutional analysis, a taking occurring after adequate
notice and opportunity for hearing is by definition not a mistaken deprivation. There
may be some difficulty determining which fact-finding questions are relevant in creating or preventing mistaken deprivations, but having done so, we assume the specified
procedure is completely effective. Thus the costs to debtor-defendants from variations
in procedure are costs of continuing mistakes until they are eliminated in a delayed
hearing. Professor Scott has provided a thorough and enlightening consideration of the
relevant costs and benefits when this assumption is relaxed. See Scott, supra note 5.
71407 U.S. at 82.
7, 416 U.S. at 628 (Powell, J., Concurring).
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possession.12 A similar balance may be achieved not by increasing the costs of delay to the party interested in seizure but by
reducing the costs of summary action to the party in possession. This is the meaning of the diverse decisions in the cases
under discussion. The reduction of the risk of wrongful takings
and the minimizing of the impact of wrongful takings which
the majority saw present in the Louisiana sequestration procedure upheld in Mitchell so diminished the costs to debtors in
possession as to make them less weighty than the legitimate
interests of the state in protecting the value of the creditors'
collateral. This balance was struck notwithstanding the special
constitutional interest in preventing mistaken takings.
This recognition of a limited area in which the balancing
of the competing interests is permissible is in keeping with the
flexible approach to due process which has been traditional in
the Court's decisions under the fourteenth amendment.73 It assures that the critical objective of the due process clause, the
prevention of arbitrary and mistaken takings, will receive a
minimum level of protection, either by prior notice and hearing
or by a substitute procedure which will also safeguard that
interest. The Court will scrutinize carefully the adequacy of
such substitute procedures, upholding statutes like the one in
Mitchell, rejecting statutes like the one in North Georgia Finishing, Inc. This approach, however, also allows the state to
give special protection to important public and private interests which might bear exceptional costs if an unyielding rule
of prior hearing were imposed.
V.

CONCLUSION

We recognize there are those who will regard the foregoing
discussion as naive. The decisions in Fuentes, Mitchell, and
North Georgia Finishing, Inc., some critics will say, may be
72 See The Supreme Court 1971 Term 86 HARv. L. REv. 50, 91 (1972).

' These cases are reviewed in Justice White's opinion in Mitchell. 416 U.S. at 61114. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1969) also appears to promulgate an absolute rule
of prior notice and opportunity for hearing. Id. at 263-64. However, Goldberg might
be reconciled with the model proposed here in that the statute invalidated in Goldberg
allowed the lapse of a possible 22 "working days" between the time a post-termination
fair hearing was requested and the time a decision was rendered, and this potential 22
day time lapse would not qualify as a sufficiently prompt determination. The Court
noted that even this time limit was rarely observed. 397 U.S. at 259-60, n. 5.
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explained not by an overarching legal principle or policy but
by the appointments of Justices Powell and Rehnquist and the
indecision of Justice White. They would insist that to construct
emerging principles by reconciling the opinions of judges who
were in basic disagreement is to engage in a pointless exercise
in scholasticism. However, even assuming the premises of this
argument to be true, we disagree. 4
All court-made law is the product of the learning and opinions of individual judges at different times. The motives and
moods of these judges cover the widest possible range and undoubtedly influence the decisions they render. Notwithstanding this, the common law has yielded what must be accorded
the title of rules. The rule that a promise given in return for
consideration is enforceable is elementary black letter law. But
it is the product of centuries of decisions based on diverse and
sometimes conflicting factors. 75 May we then say that the rules
of consideration are only an academic fiction? The creation of
more or less consistent rules out of more or less divergent decisions presents a paradox explained by the broad constraints in
which judges operate.76 The effectiveness of stare decisis may
be debated, but it is incontestable that judges as a group rationalize their results on decisions of the past. The way in
which they perform this rationalizing function will be influenced by their personal temperaments, their views of policy,
and even by the identity of the parties before them. However,
the momentum towards a rule which reconciles the demands
of the present with the decisions of the past is always present.
It seems to us that while this familiar explanation has been
readily accepted in the field of common law, it has been more
7' Other authors have attempted to reconcile the recent prejudgment seizure
cases. See, e.g., Rendleman, supra note 6 at 35. Rendleman proposes a three step due
process analysis: 1) Does the debtor possess a constitutionally cognizable interest in
the disputed property? 2) Are the interests sole or dual? 3) Considering the nature of
the interests, what process is due? Id. at 41.
" See T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW, 649-56 (5th ed.
1956). Alas, even this is not free from doubt. Professor Gilmore has given a compelling
explanation of the doctrine of consideration and other aspects of contract law not as
the product of judicial evolution but as an academic creation of late nineteenth century
scholars and jurists. GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 18-34 (1974). The more traditional view, however, is not without its persuasive defenders. Gordley, Book Review,
89 HARv. L. REv. 452 (1975).
7' See generally B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1964).
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skeptically received when applied to the law of the Constitution. Perhaps the striking statures and personalities of Supreme Court Justices and the great public interest in the issues
with which they deal have made us more sensitive to the individual motives in particular cases than to the long-term results
of the process of adjudication. 77 We believe the nature and
purpose of constitutional law should stimulate great concern
for the discovery of principles in the work product of the United
States Supreme Court even when the superficial result appears
chaotic. To give up this search because an individual decision
or vote may be based on politics or unreason, is to resign ourselves to a constitutional law which is essentially undiscoverable. Such resignation is antithetical to the very idea of a
government limited by law.
It is the shared task of lawyers, judges and academicians
to make sense out of the often irritating and diverse profusion
of case law which is the constitutional law of the United States.
We cannot expect to arrive at a perfectly consistent and unchanging set of answers to questions which arise under the
Constitution. But we can hope to keep the task within manageable limits by formulating working rules through a process
which accommodates constitutional text, decided cases and
social policy. It has been to this end that we have offered our
suggestions on the proper meaning to be attributed to the constitutional cases discussed.
11See generally Miller & Howell, The Myth of Neutrality in Constitutional
Adjudication, 27 Cm. L. REv. 661 (1960).

